Introduction
The review explores the documented functions and reported value that Mental Health Commissions (MHCs) can make to the development and sustaining of comprehensive, evidence-based, recovery-oriented and highquality systems of mental healthcare on a state, provincial or national basis. MHCs fall into two broad groups (see Table 1 ): firstly, a more narrow and restricted model (type I), which serves regulatory, inspectorial, medicolegal and even inquisitorial functions, for example, Ireland [1] , Scotland (see websites Table II) , and the proposed commissioner in the Australian state of Victoria. The wider model (type II) provides more proactive system-wide consultation and surveillance, arm's-length monitoring to ensure a transparent accountability mechanism independent of service providers and management, and encouragement, rather than focusing mainly on individuals and complaints. The latter MHCs are able to apply more direct leverage with governments, via legislated and mandated direct reporting to first minis-ters, governments and parliaments. A prominent example is the New Zealand Commission, which has been in existence since 1998 and arguably has been critical to ensuring that New Zealand's mental health services have had bi-partisan political support, financial and other resources, and the ethos and conceptual basis to provide a coherent and practical framework for service development [2] [3] [4] . Similar MHCs, such as in Canada and Western Australia, have been implemented in 2007 [5, 6] and early 2010 (see websites, Table 2 ) respectively, following considerable deliberation as to their form. The means and the process by which these Commissions are now actively promoting and shaping the realization of mental health service reform, and have been supporting service development in New Zealand, Canada and now Western Australia, will be appraised (see Table 2 ). Brief consideration only is given to a third subtype which consists of a temporary Mental Health Commission of Inquiry, as has recently occurred nationally in the USA (2002) (2003) [7] [8] [9] [10] , as well as in Wisconsin (1996) (1997) [11] . Inquiries or reporting undertaken by generic health a and social service commissions, such as England's National Health Service Care Quality Commission, the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA) of Northern Ireland or the Australian Human Rights Commission and annual Report on Government (ROG) in Australia are out of scope of this review.
Characteristics and achievements
There are several key characteristics of MHCs, particularly of the wider type II variations, which have been associated with considerable achievements within their jurisdictions, and which may well hold much relevance to other countries, provinces, states and territories.
Wider or narrower mandate?
Whereas the narrower mandate MHCs have inherited an individual-centred regulatory or inspectorial focus, they have been demonstrating interest in and/or movement toward some of the more system-wide service development and monitoring functions of the wider models. The West Australian Commission's draft legislation initially followed a narrow inspectorate model, but, after extensive consultations with wider model commissions, its final mandate was expanded, and it was given the additional clout of budget holding and commissioning services (as originally recommended also for the New Zealand Commission by the Mason Report [12] ), as well as monitoring cost-effectiveness of service delivery.
Positive agenda
The wider, more systemic mandate MHCs have focused on a more positive agenda of encouraging service users and providers in their aspirations for service development, and persuading governments to commit to sorely needed enhancements. They have inspired trust by stakeholders in their independent voice, their leverage with government and their commitment to sustaining close and regular consultation with service users and carers.
Independence and transparency
The need for independence and transparency of accountability mechanisms, and the MHCs' terms of reference when these allow it 'to undertake whatever tasks are required to meet its responsibilities', as in New Zealand [13, 14] , are widely considered to be crucial to ensure real service enhancements, and to gain and retain public confidence [15, 16 ] . Accountability or evaluation mechanisms which are internal to or dependent on health departments or ministries, even when quite elaborate (e.g. [17 ]), can be used to produce results which are easily gamed or massaged to make even laissez-faire or regressive administrations look good.
Enhancing mental health service resources
One of the most important initial achievements of the New Zealand Commission was to produce the Blueprint (1998) [18] concerning how best practice and detailed consultations with all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, could be applied to the nation's mental health services with a recovery agenda. The gaps between existing services and the Blueprint were formally defined and costed by the Commission. Whereas the Commission has enjoyed bi-partisan political support, an incoming government was elected with a platform of funding these gaps, and proceeded to do so with annual increments ('Blueprint money'), enhancing the calibre and consistency of mental health services remarkably. The result in New Zealand is that more than 80% of mental health services are now provided in the community (its demographically related neighbour Australia is struggling to attain even 50% community provision, based on unreliable figures, which may often include hospital-based outpatient visits), with 30% of mental health budgets spent on strict contracts with the NGO sector to enhance community services (Australian states average about 6-7%), and per capita expenditure on mental health far exceeding Australia's by more than 100% of public and NGO funding, and by 50% with private practice included. New Zealand now spends 11% of its . This is the independent body responsible for monitoring and inspecting the availability and quality of health and social care services in Northern Ireland, and encouraging improvements in the quality of those services.
It reports on all health and social services, with mental health and learning disability combined being just one component. Therefore it no longer qualifies as a discrete MHC for the purposes of this review.
health budget on mental health services, whereas in Australia, this proportion is soon to regress from >7 to 6%. This compares poorly with the average burden of disease due to mental ill health being 14% of all disease states internationally.
Formally promoting the recovery, holistic care and human rights agendas including consumer involvement and early intervention in services Some MHCs have been responsible for introducing and formally promoting the recovery and human rights agendas within government deliberations, policies, plans and standards regarding mental health services [19 , [20] [21] [22] . Examples include:
(1) New Zealand MHC Recovery Competencies [23] .
(2) The goals of New Zealand's [24 ] , and Ireland's [25] MHC and the USA's NFC [26] include that mental healthcare is consumer and family-driven and follows a recovery approach. (3) The needs for preventive mental health services and early intervention, including in primary care settings, have been strongly promoted by the New Zealand MHC [27, 28 ] . The Canadian MHC has striven to make recovery and well being the guiding principles of modern mental health services [29, 30 ] . (4) The importance of striving for the human rights of individuals with mental illness has become entwined with the push for mental health reform by MHCs and other organizations [31] .
Amplifying consumer, carer, homeless, comorbid, indigenous and multicultural and other previously unheard, disregarded or marginalized voices, and responding to these voices with advocacy for better services
MHCs usually maintain open channels of communication continuously with all stakeholders, including all these groups. As part of research to ascertain the needs of and better ways to serve these groups (e.g. MHC of Canada's forthcoming national study of homelessness and mental illness), qualitative methods, including first-person narrative accounts, or storytelling [31, 32] , may be employed by MHCs to elicit a more vivid sampling of the lived experience of service users from different backgrounds. The metaphor of 'pathways' or the personal or family 'journey' through mental illness or the system is often invoked in such MHC research (e.g. [33] ).
Challenging stigma and discrimination
Programmes to promote mental health and well being and to reduce stigma and discrimination are being nurtured as part of the core tasks particularly of type II MHCs (e.g. Canada). In New Zealand, this has resulted in the most successful 'Like Minds, Like Mine' programme (www.likeminds.org.nz) (accessed 22 June 2010), which initially fostered grassroots local peopleto-people interactive networks, operating in advance to capitalize on the subsequent waves of mass media campaigns, with strategies for long-term sustainability built in. Variants of these campaigns have been developed for indigenous populations and the workforce.
Promoting the mental health service transformation and reform agendas
Mental Health Commissions have succeeded in explicitly progressing the mental health reform agenda. MHCs are viewed as a basic tool in the international pathway to mental health service transformation, particularly as they have promoted the adoption of the recovery paradigm into national and state reform agendas [34 ] . They are providing a publicly accessible clearing house for evidence-based best practice, and are independently informing or being given the responsibility to develop national or state mental health strategies at arm's length from the usual bureaucracies [Mental Health Commission of Canada (MHCC)]. Whitaker and Deikman [35 ] indicate that the resistance to humane mental health reform is still formidable and detail strategies to overcome it, whereas reforms in process sometimes look better on paper than in actuality, or may lose momentum over time [36] .
Monitoring progress and lack of it with announced reforms: money is not always everything Most MHCs use their regular consultations with all stakeholders to monitor progress with promised reforms, as well as accessing available data and conducting particular studies (e.g., Canadian MHC into homelessness and mental illness). The New Zealand MHC published its Blueprint [18] , then performed a gap analysis to determine services which were badly needed but were missing, then costed the gaps for government to consider funding them, which it did. In Australia a standardized national scorecard approach to monitoring mental health services approach across all states, territories and health regions has been proposed for such an authority (Crosbie, D, pers. comm.). The Irish MHC documented that many of the provisions announced in a Department of Health Plan to develop accessible community mental health services were not delivered over 2 decades, so that Irish services remained inequitably resourced and substantially underdeveloped [37] . While the funding increases associated with the MHC Blueprint in New Zealand have been widely welcomed, there is continuing concern among service users and families that financial investment does not necessarily always translate into the substantive better mental healthcare promised in national strategies [38] .
Evaluating new innovations
Academic appeals are being made to the Canadian MHC to consider recommending implementation of fee-forservice psychologist arrangements similar to those which have been implemented in Australia, despite mixed and controversial results so far [39 ] and advocating for clinical prevention guidelines for childhood mental disorders [40 ] and for better mental health practices for elderly individuals [41] .
Open-access source of data
Arising from their medico-legal and monitoring roles, the Scottish, Irish, and Northern Ireland MHCs have become an important accessible source of data via their annual reports for trending, particularly the amount and results of involuntary care [42, 43] .
A commissioning commission
The Western Australian MHC will be commissioning services through identification of appropriate service providers, benchmarks and the establishment of rigorous contracting arrangements with both government and nongovernment sectors, and the provision of grants, transfers and service contract arrangements. Commissioning encompasses purchasing on the basis of agreed values and evidence of cost-effectiveness. The MHC will also hold the mental health budget, separately from the general health budget. When it was first proposed by the Mason Report [12] the New Zealand MHC was envisaged to have a commissioning and purchasing capacity, but, possibly due to the separate and parallel development of a national system of efficient regional health commissioning authorities, purchasing regionally and then locally at arm's length from all providers, to provide tightly contracted integrated mental health services, this was not deemed necessary or desirable.
Applications of Mental Health Commissions to different jurisdictions
Mental Health Commissions of both types I and II have been established and their roles sustained in both state and national jurisdictions. Government officials in Australia have often dismissed the relevance of the New Zealand MHC, arguing that it only works in a uni-state nation, and that it could not work in a more complex, federated context [15] . The advent of the MHC of Canada has significantly deflated this argument. A combination of state/provincial MHCs based on the West Australian model and a complementary national MHC providing comparative monitoring and knowledge exchange could be a solution for federations.
Informal functions
In terms of informal functions, a well constituted and connected MHC can ensure that no substantial stakeholder groups or minorities (e.g. indigenous, multicultural, comorbid service users and family carers) will have their interests ignored ever again, at least for the life of the commission; a MHC can resolve many problems between departmental silos which may be impeding mental health services, through the personal standing and contacts of the commissioners (e.g., Barbara Disley as founding chair of the MHC in New Zealand), ([44] , Wayne Miles, pers. comm.); and a MHC can contribute considerably to the diminution of discriminatory news stories in the media, and of repetitive demands for public inquiries, sometimes in complementarity to standing investigative authorities. Since the Mason inquiry in 1996, which recommended the formation of the MHC, there have been no major national inquiries related to mental health in New Zealand, although there have been several minor ones [12] . In Canada, the Hon. Mike Kirby, inaugural chair of the MHCC, is a prominent retired senator with a distinguished record of public service, who has invoked his own family's experience of caring for a sibling with mental illness in advocating strongly for a MHC for some years before its inception. The broad political and personal respect he has earned explains the tri-partisan support received by the MHCC, and, in terms of his public standing, he has just received the highest award for a non-physician by the Canadian Medical Association (Calgary Herald, 18 August 2010).
Walking together
Relations between Governments and MHCs are usually collaborative rather than conflictual. Most seasoned commissioners have striven to consistently provide independent and frank advice to government, based on both grass-roots consultation and evidence. Sometimes they will disagree strongly with a particular new or entrenched government approach, at the same time working hard to maintain the relationship and goodwill, so that they may reciprocally develop a modus operandi of 'walking together' in the interests of improving the lives of service users ( [15] , Wilson J, pers. comm., Disley B, pers. comm.). It has been useful in establishing the authority and credibility of these MHCs that they have been personally announced and/or had their functions strongly endorsed, championed and financially backed by prime ministers (e.g. in Canada and New Zealand) or their state premier (first minister) as in Western Australia.
Limitations of Mental Health Commissions
There are several concerns and possible limitations concerning MHCs which warrant special consideration.
Reform agendas can be misused and abused
Top-down imposed 'Mental Health Reforms' cannot always be guaranteed to be a good thing, are not always in the interests of individual service users, and their misuses further down the track may be hidden, insidious or unpredictable at the time of implementation. If implemented with insensitivity, excessively controlling or frankly discriminatory intent, they can turn out to be neglectful or oppressive (e.g., Nazi Germany, [45] ).
Reorganization of services can be seen historically as cyclical, causing discontinuities of care with each turn of the wheel. So, it is important to have a mechanism such as an MHC to consider all proposals for change carefully in advance through well developed partnerships and regular forums amongall stakeholders [45] [46] [47] [48] . It is equally important to ensure that a more enabling culture (e.g. encompassing human rights, holistic and recovery-oriented care) is nurtured and grown for endurance with any reorganization, such as a shift towards community-centred services. This is alsowhenimplementationofbothsquarelyevidence-based and values-based practices should meet [32, 49] .
Where is the evidence?
There are too few working MHCs in the world, particularly type II MHCs, to confidently generalize from their considerable promise and achievements as yet. It is also too soon, as, while the first predominantly type I MHC was first established in 1960 in Scotland, only one type II MHC has stood the test of time to any extent (New Zealand, since 1998) in achieving and sustaining positive outcomes in terms of substantial service reform over an extended period.
Mental Health Commissions may not always be 'handson' enough for some National MHCs such as Canada's may be established with significant funding to promote, monitor and research the best directions of reform over a whole decade, but are unable to enhance directly the resourcing of, or priority granted to, the mental health portfolio within individual provinces, who retain principal responsibility for mental health service delivery [50 ] . Adoption by the MHCC of a type II MHC model that incorporates some of the Western Australian features may be a corrective to this. Adoption by all provinces of a complementary Western Australian variant on the type II MHC model may be another alternative.
Duplicating bureaucracies?
There is a perceived danger of duplicating the preexisting mental health bureaucracy, but most national MHCs have only a small staff to undertake their designated tasks and must be efficient to succeed (e.g. the impressive track record of the New Zealand Commission has been achieved with only 12 staff and three commissioners). At the other end of the spectrum, in Western Australia, all positions but two in the central mental health directorate have been transferred to the MHC, amounting to 44 positions by the end of June 2009, and it is anticipated that this will eventually rise to 75 positions. However, this complement will manage the entire budget holding and commissioning of all mental health services for the state, as well as all monitoring of costeffectiveness and adequacy of service provision. It will also coordinate state-wide community awareness, chal-lenging stigma and suicide prevention strategies and will progress the updating of the state mental health act. It has such a broad brief that it is yet to be seen whether the commission can remain at arm's length from having to take responsibility for day-to-day service delivery issues, and whether it can function as at least a semi-independent monitoring body. Arguably, it may have a better chance of doing so, with a more streamlined staff, if its commissioning function can be devolved to more regionally based purchasers over time. [16 ] .
Possibly compromised role and conflicts of interest
Despite the broad mandate of the Northern Ireland MHC (since absorbed into a general health and social services inspectorate, 2009), Heenan [51 ] echoes concerns about its work which may apply to all type I MHCs -that, due to resource restriction, its role had been confined to monitoring the compliance with legal documentation, visiting hospital and community facilities and providing advice. The Commission's keyobjective was to protect the rights of the service user, but, as it also provided informal advice to service providers, this could constitute a conflict of interest. Despite its focus on safeguarding the needs and rights of the service user, relatively few users and carers had been appointed as Commissioners or were involved in the management of the Commission. Ireland is committed to the implementation of the national mental health strategy, which will lead to a system of comprehensive, recoveryoriented services. However, the MHC of Ireland has been taken to task for routinely extending delays before convening individual tribunals during admissions, ostensibly to minimize costs [52 ] . This may be seen as a conflict with its duty to protect service user rights. It may be better not to have to confound its statutory role ['to protect the interests of (individual) persons detained under the Mental Health Act'] with its collective advocacy role ('to promote, encourage and foster the establishment and maintenance of high standards and good practices in the delivery of mental health services'). These functions might be better served by separately funded bodies, so that one does not interfere with the credibility of and confidence in the other.
Conclusion
Despite all the policies, plans, strategies, reports and proposals released over recent years on mental health reform in various nations, on the whole we still have not seen a consistent and stable roll-out of evidence-based and recovery-oriented system building that might drive some of the tangible improvements so desperately needed.
To ensure real value for money and transparent accountability for mental health services, at arm's length from services and government, Australia, the USA and undoubtedly other countries would benefit from dedicated independent national MHCs, as already exist in New Zealand and Canada. The Republic of Ireland and to some extent Scotland, while still focused on regulatory functions, are heading in this direction. Western Australia is the first state in Australia with a predominantly type II MHC, as it was part of the government's election platform, and the Western Australia government has been very determined in pursuing its implementation. The MHC has had enormous influence in New Zealand in enhancing resources to an internationally acceptable proportion of the health budget and to deal with the high relative disease burden due to mental illnesses, through its systematic service monitoring, advocacy and collaborative efforts to improve service quality.
A MHC should also monitor the effective allocation and use of mental health resources. This accountability mechanism requires resources and expertise to make it credible, and should be largely transparent and publicly accessible.
As in Canada, a MHC can effectively operate in a federated context in countries like Australia, relating to both the federal and state/provincial/territorial levels of government.
It should report on an all-of-government basis to all parliaments and to the public, with a direct link to the prime minister, premiers, first ministers and health ministers.
In different jurisdictions, such commissions may also be required to undertake related tasks, such as determining, promoting and monitoring the ongoing national antistigma and antidiscrimination agenda, mental health workforce and homelessness strategies [53 ] , budget-holding and providing specific commissioning to address gaps in key mental health services. The latter requires a combination of considerable clinical, economic and lived experience expertise within or immediately available to the commission.
Australia's pressing need for a national standing commission has been actively canvassed by many in the mental health community for at least a decade (e.g. [15,16 ,54 , 55-58] ). Among other developed countries, Australia's accountability mechanisms for the quality of its mental health services [17 ,59] are internal to the system, not at arm's length, and so are vulnerable to spin, gloss, and manipulation, with the release of results sometimes being delayed for years or even completely suppressed [60 ] . Whereas their particular indicators are admirable, on the whole these internal government mechanisms may promote complacency, and now have been surpassed by, and compare poorly with, New Zealand and Canada, whose health systems are most closely related to those of Australia and Britain.
It is concluded that any State or National Strategy for mental health service reform or development could be complemented by a standing national mental health commission (or similarly constituted authority or body) of the more sophisticated type, with a wider, more systemic mandate. There is a strong case for the ongoing utility and applicability of wider (type II) MHC models in the longer term for jurisdictions with or without existing commissions, and that the wider MHC model could be extended fruitfully to other countries and states, especially where mental health service development has been inconsistent, inequitable or stalled.
It could also promote and advise formally on specific issues for those whole jurisdictions, for example enhancing community awareness and knowledge, decreasing stigma and discrimination, promoting services related to homelessness and comorbidities, improving workforce recruitment and retention, protecting mental health budgets and orchestrating commissioning of effective services. Australia's and other countries' needs for an overarching national mental health programme and commission to oversee it are exemplified.
Mental Health Commission, 2010. Statement of intent 2010-2013, Wellington: Mental Health Commission, New Zealand Government. This statement was presented to the New Zealand House of Representatives pursuant to the Crown Entities Act 2004. It presents an outcomes framework, including promoting integrated and recovery-oriented services in an inclusive community environment.
